Re: Shuttle Safety [was: Re...

Thanks for pointing out my need to clarify my words, as I can see where
you could misunderstand that I was referring to the structural conflict
of interest built in to the nasa administrators professional decisions
between the his politically elected superiors who are motivated to
reduce spending, and the professional act of requesting spending as
recommended for safety upgrades by the independent body of the asap.
Actually the EAPU is an example of the subjective professional
decisions by a nasa administrator that a project was not financially
worth the investment, but the EAPU was a recommended safety upgrade by
the asap, therefore a professional subjective decision placed budgetary
concerns over safety. The concept of funding a complete system qra is
to provide the nasa administrator as well as engineers/managers the
best tool in making decisions as to how to prioritize safety upgrades
such as the EAPU, and therefore produce a safer completion of the
stated orbiters operational mission, and that is space station
construction by 2010.

Once again nasa own words.
Nasa perspective on risk Assesment
February 24, 2004
Michael G. Stamatelatos, Ph.D.,Director
Safety and Assurance Requirements Division
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance
NASA Headquarters
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/aseb/stamatelatos_nasa_presentation.pdf
page 17
"Experience has shown why Quantitative Risk Assesment is needed: To
improve safety in design, operation, maintenance, and upgrade
(throughout) life cycle, To help ensure mission success; To improve
performance; and To reduce design, operation and maintenance costs, To
support management decisions"


Now once again your question of how to fund safety upgrades is the
exact concern I share myself, and the asap shares as well. According
to osha the cost of the Columbia tragedy in 2003 was $
1,076,332,029.00 (*25), and even though the caib determined long term
budgetary constraints contributed to the tragedy nasa still diverted
"$170 million from space shuttle upgrades" to the return to flight
program (*26). The diversion of funds from safety upgrades on projects
started before the death of the sts-107 crew, and re-allocating the
money for another project in the return to flight, neglects the
original safety concerns that were deemed important for safe flight.
Therefore the return to flight project was deemed a higher priority and
the previous upgrades, and unless part of rtf are discontinued such as
the EAPU. By looking at the DOLLARS alone and the accounting loss for
the death of the sts-107 crew, it would be financially prudent to
conduct a qra to understand where the greatest needs for safety
upgrades are in the orbiter program as to safely complete the stated
operational mission of space station construction by 2010.
Tom


*25.
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/safety/osha/OSHA_2004%20.pdf
ANNUAL OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Reporting Period Fiscal Year: 2004
Page 27 XIII. NASA Agency Property Damage, 5-years (figure 12)
The property damage cost at NASA Centers from 2000 to 2004 is
illustrated in
Figure 12. · In 2004, a favorable decrease in property damage cost by
$1,074,513,875.00 since 2003 was observed.
· In 2003, the cause of the spike was attributed to the following:
Item Cost STS 107 Space Shuttle $ 1,076,332,029.00

(*26)
NASA's Space Shuttle Program: Issues for
Congress Related to The Columbia Tragedy
and "Return to Flight"
Marcia S. Smith
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/48804.pdf
page 4, par 3
" Cost. NASA's most recent public estimate of the total cost for
RTF (FY2003-2009)
was released in July 2004. RTF costs are in addition to regular shuttle
funding, although
some of the RTF money has been taken from other shuttle-related
activities (e.g.
upgrades). The July 2004 estimate was $2.2 billion, double the previous
estimate of $1.1
billion. For FY2005, NASA requested $4.3 billion for the shuttle
program. In November
2004, NASA informed Congress it needed $762 million more than expected
for FY2005.
In the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-447), Congress
approved the
$4.3 billion, subject to an across-the-board 0.80% rescission.
Conferees stated (H.Rept.
108-792) that NASA could submit a request for supplemental
appropriations, or
reprogram funds from other NASA programs. Congress also appropriated
$126 million
to NASA in an FY2005 emergency supplemental for hurricane relief (P.L.
108-324).
According to a May 10, 2005 update to its FY2005 operating plan, NASA
is
reprogramming the following funds into RTF: $55 million from the
Science Mission
Directorate ($20 million from space science, $35 million from earth
science); $375.8
million from the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate ($73 million
from biological
and physical research, $204 million from human and robotic technology,
and $98 million
from transportation systems); and $331.2 million from the Space
Operations Mission
Directorate ($160 million from the space station, $170 million from
space shuttle
upgrades, and $1.2 million from space flight support).
Whether the shuttle program overall is receiving adequate funding
continues to be
a question. The CAIB noted that long term budget constraints were a
factor in the
Columbia tragedy. NASA's FY2006 shuttle budget request is $4.5
billion, with a
projection that it will decline to $2.4 billion by FY2010. NASA plans
to retire the shuttle in 2010. Whether the agency can accomplish the
remaining required shuttle launches (see
below) within such a declining shuttle budget remains to be seen."



Malcolm Bacchus wrote:
In article <1153620606.989341.61960@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
columbiaaccidentinvestigation@xxxxxxxxx (columbiaaccidentinvestigation)
wrote:

The interesting thing with quoting a nasa administrator, is this
person is in the position of having to request funds from congress,
for asap recommended safety upgrades that the administrator may not
agree with in the first place.

It may be interesting but it has little to do with the point I was
answering. Or are you now prepared to agree that your previous posting
quoting the NASA Annual Report wasn't really helpful and that,
therefore, the discussion should be sidetracked onto another point?

That is a contradictory position as the head of nasa

The only contradiction, if there is a contradiction is between his
personal views and what he has to do in his job. So what? People often
have to do what they don't personally agree with.

But you have jumped logic again. If you had said " that the
administrator will not agree with" I would agree with you that you would
have identified a moral issue for that particular administrator -
although whether the issue would be sufficient for the administrator to
do something about would depend on the level of conflict and the
strength of his/her personal beliefs.

But I note that you have said " the administrator may not agree with".
So you are not only posing a personal moral issue rather than a
practical issue but are posing a _hypothetical_ personal moral issue.

I don't really think that needs dealing with in terms of practical
consideration of safety.

Malcolm B

.

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