Re: Shuttle Safety [was: Re...

The interesting thing with quoting a nasa administrator, is this person
is in the position of having to request funds from congress, for asap
recommended safety upgrades that the administrator may not agree with
in the first place. That is a contradictory position as the head of
nasa is a politically appointed position, and as I stated earlier the
administrations omb has as been documented in cutting funds for nasas
safety upgrades. And therefore the nasa administrator requesting funds
for a qra that may result in more funding for safety upgrades would
possibly be seen as detrimental to the administrations budget cutting
desires, and therefore the nasa administrator is placed in a position
of choosing orbiter safety over the recommendations of his superiors, a
structurally built in conflict of interest.

You stated

"> So sorry. No. You are reading into a PR document something which
that
PR document may have been carefully crafted to imply but categorically
does not say. You really will have to do better than that.

I prefer to rely on the words of the Administrator who has said, time
and time again, that you cannot ensure 100% safety, that space flight is
a risky business and that given the constraints that the government (and
hence the US people) impose, space flight must be a game of playing the
odds."

Once someone becomes aware of a deficiency that can violate a persons
safety (as defined by nasa) for whom they are responsible, they are
ethically obligated to rectify that deficiency, otherwise society civil
laws have deemed them negligent. This concept directly applies to my
conclusion as to how a complete shuttle program qra is necessary, and
how once we become aware of the orbiters deficiencies in safety and
redundancies; we are obligated to make the proper corrections.
Neglecting to address a problem or deficiency after we become aware of
it, and continuing to operate the shuttles without at least attempting
to identify effects of this problem, then is not safe shuttle
operations, and it is getting away with what you can.

Your question of how to fund a completed integrated qra for the shuttle
program is very interesting, as funding for nasa's programs is a
direct function of political motivation, not scientific validity.
Because you are requesting how I would seek funding for a complete
integrated qra of the shuttle program does that mean you accept the
validity of my findings and citations that such a complete review of
the program is necessary because of the unknown safety and redundancy
compromises caused by fod/sedimentation/contamination in the orbiters
hydraulic system?

If your answer is no, then you may be asking the question to somehow
invalidate my findings and I must remind you that I have independently
researched and arrived to my conclusions through critical thinking,
cross-referencing, and logical analysis from nasas own bodies of works.


If you do find my conclusions valid and you are curious as to how to
achieve funding for such project as a complete and integrated qra for
the shuttle program, we start here with us. Political funding for
governmental programs is a subjective decision making process, and the
scientific validity of my conclusion as to the necessity for a shuttle
program qra demonstrates the necessity to raise safety to the highest
priority in our space program, as this would increase political
motivation to fund such projects. Politics and politicians are subject
to a lobby influence, especially when confronted with an interested
informed constituency such as the space geek community lobbying for one
cause. Understanding people like us have the ability to make a change
through political activism, and yes we can say safety must be the
highest priority, and demand realistic funding for what we deem
important, with a reasonable civil voice from both sides of the
political spectrum. That is what we should have done after challenger,
but after Columbia I am somewhat taken back by the inability of people
to at least admit my conclusions in this thread are valid.

I do understand the struggle with the scarcity of resources that faces
our government, and the limitations that exist as to how solve all
problems in our society, and inherently increasing funding for the
space program safety upgrades will come at the expense of other
programs inside or outside of nasa.

Funding and completion of such a large project as a shuttle program qra
will have the benefit of us fully understand the shuttle fleet before
we retire it in 2010, and for providing a more complete foundation when
our nation is ready to design the next generation winged space vehicle.
Politicians qualitatively make decisions about what issues/problems
our society and is determines where our government spends money to
address what we deem important. That is why it is imperative for the
space community to push for safety first in our space program, and
lobby our politicians for funding the asap's requested safety
upgrades for the orbiter.

Now once again your question of how to fund safety upgrades is the
exact concern I share myself, and the asap shares as well. According
to osha the cost of the Columbia tragedy in 2003 was $
1,076,332,029.00 (*26), and even though the caib determined long term
budgetary constraints contributed to the tragedy nasa still diverted
"$170 million from space shuttle upgrades" to the return to flight
program. The diversion of funds from safety upgrades on projects
started before the death of the sts-107 crew, and re-allocating the
money for another project in the return to flight, neglects the
original safety concerns that were deemed important for safe flight.
Therefore the return to flight project was deemed a higher priority and
the previous upgrades, and unless part of rtf are discontinued such as
the EAPU. By looking at the DOLLARS alone and the accounting loss for
the death of the sts-107 crew, it would be financially prudent to
conduct a qra to understand where the greatest needs for safety
upgrades are in the orbiter program as to safely complete the stated
operational mission of space station construction by 2010.

Hey "Malcolm" sorry for the typo, my name is tom, but call me what
you want as long as this discussion is civil and progressive.
tom

*26.
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/safety/osha/OSHA_2004%20.pdf
ANNUAL OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Reporting Period Fiscal Year: 2004
Page 27 XIII. NASA Agency Property Damage, 5-years (figure 12)
The property damage cost at NASA Centers from 2000 to 2004 is
illustrated in
Figure 12. · In 2004, a favorable decrease in property damage cost by
$1,074,513,875.00 since 2003 was observed.
· In 2003, the cause of the spike was attributed to the following:
Item Cost STS 107 Space Shuttle $ 1,076,332,029.00

(*26)
NASA's Space Shuttle Program: Issues for
Congress Related to The Columbia Tragedy
and "Return to Flight"
Marcia S. Smith
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/48804.pdf
page 4, par 3
" Cost. NASA's most recent public estimate of the total cost for
RTF (FY2003-2009)
was released in July 2004. RTF costs are in addition to regular shuttle
funding, although
some of the RTF money has been taken from other shuttle-related
activities (e.g.
upgrades). The July 2004 estimate was $2.2 billion, double the previous
estimate of $1.1
billion. For FY2005, NASA requested $4.3 billion for the shuttle
program. In November
2004, NASA informed Congress it needed $762 million more than expected
for FY2005.
In the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-447), Congress
approved the
$4.3 billion, subject to an across-the-board 0.80% rescission.
Conferees stated (H.Rept.
108-792) that NASA could submit a request for supplemental
appropriations, or
reprogram funds from other NASA programs. Congress also appropriated
$126 million
to NASA in an FY2005 emergency supplemental for hurricane relief (P.L.
108-324).
According to a May 10, 2005 update to its FY2005 operating plan, NASA
is
reprogramming the following funds into RTF: $55 million from the
Science Mission
Directorate ($20 million from space science, $35 million from earth
science); $375.8
million from the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate ($73 million
from biological
and physical research, $204 million from human and robotic technology,
and $98 million
from transportation systems); and $331.2 million from the Space
Operations Mission
Directorate ($160 million from the space station, $170 million from
space shuttle
upgrades, and $1.2 million from space flight support).
Whether the shuttle program overall is receiving adequate funding
continues to be
a question. The CAIB noted that long term budget constraints were a
factor in the
Columbia tragedy. NASA's FY2006 shuttle budget request is $4.5
billion, with a
projection that it will decline to $2.4 billion by FY2010. NASA plans
to retire the shuttle in 2010. Whether the agency can accomplish the
remaining required shuttle launches (see
below) within such a declining shuttle budget remains to be seen."




Malcolm Bacchus wrote:
In article <1153610835.519649.200190@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
columbiaaccidentinvestigation@xxxxxxxxx (columbiaaccidentinvestigation)
wrote:


Hey malcom, and any body who disputes that safety should be first,
please realize your are arguing with nasas own words as you should
read
the following
.
Space shuttle annual report 2001
Page 3
"Space Shuttle Program Goal 1 . Fly Safely
Since returning to flight in 1988, the SSP has had an outstanding
safety record and significant progress has been made in improving the
reliability of some of its major components. Our goal is to ensure
that this legacy continues by investing in upgrades that
embrace advanced technologies that improve reliability while assuring
safety."

This is an annual report; it is not a detailed analysis of safety
issues. It is a PR document. Of course it is going to pander to those
people who think that safety is the be-all and end-all of everything.
That's why it uses words like "outstanding safety record" and
"significant progress".

But note it does not say that "safety" is the number one requirement.
Read it carefully, it is well written.

It says:
1. We have done well since 1988 and made progress in improving
reliability (nothing there about 100% safety or safety first)
2. That it will continue to invest in upgrades. (Taken with the
statement that they are still improving reliability, this could be taken
to mean that they acknowledge that there are still issues which they are
working on despite flying.)
3. That the upgrades will embrace advanced technologies provided that
(a) they improve reliability and (b) assure safety (this merely says
that they won't make unsafe upgrades or upgrades which are not reliable
- it says nothing about the current systems, their reliability or their
safety)

So sorry. No. You are reading into a PR document something which that
PR document may have been carefully crafted to imply but categorically
does not say. You really will have to do better than that.

I prefer to rely on the words of the Administrator who has said, time
and time again, that you cannot ensure 100% safety, that space flight is
a risky business and that given the constraints that the government (and
hence the US people) impose, space flight must be a game of playing the
odds.

Oh. And, please, if you are going to refer to me by name, spell it
correctly. It's not as if it is an uncommon name. Thanks. I can't
return the complement to you because, for some reason, you don't give
your proper name. But I would, if I could.

Malcolm B

.

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