

Re: Name the thesis: "Formal sentences capture informal ones"

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Helene.Boucher_at_wanadoo.fr

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Torkel Franzen wrote:

> *Helene.Boucher@wanadoo.fr* writes:

>

>> *Presumably you would mean by 'ordinary mathematics'*

>> *something which includes the truth of the successor axiom, so your*

>> *additional phrase answers the question "Why is it trivially true...?"*

>> *in a trivial way (the answer being, "because it's true by the*

>> *definition of 'ordinary' mathematics") or turns the question into one*

>> *of causality instead of grounds ("why has ordinary mathematics come to*

>> *include the successor axiom?").*

>

> *It's not an answer at all to the question why it is trivially true.*

> *It is merely the observation that since you put in question trivial*

> *theorems of ordinary mathematics, your regarding Con(PA) as not being*

> *a faithful translation of "PA is consistent" becomes a side issue.*

You appear to be replying to my remarks about your inclusion of "in ordinary mathematics" after "is trivially true." I therefore do not understand your comments, since they do not appear to have any relevance.

>

>> *Except (again!) the faithfulness of the translation was the issue of*

>> *the thread. And the intensional equivalence of two sentences should*

>> *not turn on whether something else is true or not.*

>

> *Naturally it turns on whether we take other things to be true.*

I think you misunderstood what I meant, so I must have been unclear.

What I meant was: if S1 and S2 are only equivalent supposing that some

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other proposition is true, then they cannot be intensionally equivalent.