

Re: incompleteness of first-order logic

Source: <http://sci.tech-archive.net/Archive/sci.logic/2006-01/msg00545.html>

- *From:* Jan Burse <janburse@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
 - *Date:* Mon, 30 Jan 2006 14:29:04 +0100
-

Li Yi wrote:

1.
Give a concrete counterexample to:
For any theory T and sentence p , $T \not\vdash p \Rightarrow T \vdash \text{not } p$.

Assume completeness, i.e. $T \models A$ iff $T \vdash A$. Then take for example the void Theory T . It is neither $T \vdash p$ nor $T \vdash \sim p$.

Because you can find $M_1 = \{p\}$ with

$$M_1 \models T \text{ and not } M_1 \models \sim p$$

Hence it is not $T \vdash p$.

And $M_2 = \{\sim p\}$ with

$$M_2 \models T \text{ and not } M_2 \models p$$

Hence it is not $T \vdash \sim p$.

2.
 M is a model. Let $\text{Th } M = \{p : M \models p\}$.
Show that $\text{Th } M$ is a complete theory, that is to say, $\text{Th } M \not\vdash p \Rightarrow \text{Th } M \vdash \text{not } p$.

This is not true. $\text{Th } M = \{p : M \models p\}$ is

Re: incompleteness of first-order logic

not a complete theory.

Take for example M_2 from above, then $\text{Th } M_2$ is the void theory, and as was shown above, the void theory is not complete.

Bye

.