

Re: Liar's Paradox in Godel's Theorem (newbie question)

Source: <http://sci.tech-archive.net/Archive/sci.logic/2006-05/msg00031.html>

- *From:* David C. Ullrich <ullrich@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
 - *Date:* Mon, 01 May 2006 06:50:23 -0500
-

On 30 Apr 2006 16:47:01 -0700, "Charlie-Boo" <shymathguy@xxxxxxxx> wrote:

Aatu Koskensisilta, Charlie-Boo wrote:

You don't believe in correcting the record, now that you see the close relationship between Liar and Godel?

There's nothing to correct. It's not particularly illuminating to know that "this sentence is not true" is not equivalent to "this sentence is not provable in PA".

It proves Godel's Theorem.

Right. Exactly how does this proof go?

Where have you seen a simpler proof? Do you believe in Occam's Razor (or its extension, C-B's Razor)?

That implication of the first incompleteness theorem doesn't tell us anything substantial about the liar paradox.

How is that an implication of the first incompleteness theorem? Truth can be different from provability, but that doesn't show that "This is not true." (one use of truth) is different from "This is not provable." (You're confusing an implication with its converse.)

C-B

Re: Liar's Paradox in Godel's Theorem (newbie question)

There is a connection between the liar paradox and Gödel's proof; Gödel arrived at his proof of the first incompleteness theorem after realizing that arithmetical truth can't be arithmetical as that would lead to the liar being expressible. This does not mean that the incompleteness theorems tell us anything about the paradox.

--

Aatu Koskensisilta (aatu.koskensisilta@xxxxxxxxxx)

"Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen"
– Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

David C. Ullrich

.