Re: A definition of 'two' (2) please?

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- *Date*: Sat, 24 Jun 2006 22:42:39 +0200

How would you formulate 1), 2) in
german, or in french, in hindi,
in mandarin?

If you try that, you would see that
there must be a sense beneath.

Logic can or cannot express this sense,
whereby logic is itself a language.
A formula language.

Your have to proof your postulate
that natural language is superior
from case to case.

In this case what objection's do you
have exactly in mind against my
formalism? Or are you not fluent
in formal languages?

John Jones wrote:

> Jan Burse wrote:
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> > John Jones wrote:
> >
> > > So, if there is any justice in the world, are
> > > 1) two instances of one thing
> > > 2) two instances of a thing
> > > 3) two things
> > > the same? and by example or definition?
> >
> > Two avoid natural language, I reformulate it as follows:
> >
> > a) exists z (is−a(x,z) & is−a(y,z))
> > b) exists z,t (is−a(x,z) & is−a(y,t))

by example, I interpret as credulous reasoning,
i.e. exists M with M[a) <−> b)]
and by definition, I interpret as skeptical reasoning,
i.e. forall M it is M[a) <−> b)]

Now if is−a is rigid then:

credulous a) and b) are the same.
(Example: apple x and apple y
there are bot instances of one thing,
and of a thing, in this case the same thing apple)

skeptical a) and b) are not the same.
(Counter Example: apple x and orange y,
there are not instances of one thing,
but there are instances of a thing)

Bye

While avoiding natural language by using symbolism can shorten the time spent reaching a conclusion, it cannot add to the sense of it, so language is indispensable, especially in this case. Why especially? Because the behaviour, relevance and type of familiar objects that the processes involving symbolism copies and mirrors, is itself in question.

Further, it needs arguing for, which symbolism cannot do, that symbolism can, by the sequencing or laying out of its symbols, determine what we are to mean by 'a' thing, as distinguished from 'one' thing. A named thing and a named thing are not two named things.

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