

Re: PARADOXES AND STATES OF AFFAIRS

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- *From:* "Rupert" <rupertmccallum@xxxxxxxx>
 - *Date:* 21 Dec 2006 02:35:42 -0800
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aatu.koskensilta@xxxxxxxx wrote:

Rupert wrote:

It seems to me we need to give an account of the nature of the connection between the sentence token and the mental events that take place when asserting it. I am reminded of Wittgenstein's thought-experiment: Say "It's warm in here" and mean "It's cold in here".

But the whole point of such thought-experiments was to show that meaning something by something does not consist in some mental act.

True. I recently bought a book called "A Spectical Guide to Meaning and Rules: Defending Kripke's Wittgenstein." It defends the "meaning scepticism" attributed by Kripke to Wittgenstein in "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language". I remember reading a discussion Wittgenstein had with Turing in which he was rather dismissive of the problem posed by the liar paradox. But it seems to me it is worthwhile to try and get clearer about the puzzle posed by the strengthened liar. I'm not sure how you would do that under an assumption of meaning scepticism.

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"Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen"
– Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus