

# Re: Existence, Self-identity and Uniqueness.

---

*Source:* <http://sci.tech-archive.net/Archive/sci.logic/2006-12/msg00486.html>

---

- *From:* Chris Menzel <cmenzel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  - *Date:* Thu, 28 Dec 2006 17:16:16 +0000 (UTC)
- 

On Thu, 28 Dec 2006 12:28:03 +0100, Jan Burse <janburse@xxxxxxxxxx> said:

Hi

Owen wrote:

Jan Burse wrote:

Wrong again.

The introduction of "the x:Fx" does not render FOL= inconsistent at all, unless you foolishly assume that non-referring descriptions are values of the individual variable.

I don't do that, why do you persist in doing that??

I was on purpose using some foolishly substitutions. Someone has to do sometimes foolishly things to show inconsistency, even in the precence of initially innocent concepts.

I did this to show you that you are not strictly working in FOL=. Because FOL= does not distinguish between foolishly and non foolishly substitutions.

How do you bar foolishly substitutions from FOL=? How do you control the following reasoning step, which works in FOL= (even in FOL without =):

forall x A(x)  
 -----  
 A(t)

Note again A is a formula. So we could also rewrite the step as follows:

forall x A  
 -----  
 A[x/t]

Re: Existence, Self-identity and Uniqueness.

Here  $A[x/t]$  denotes the result of substituting  $t$  for  $x$  in the formula  $A$ . How do you control this, and still claim you have FOL= at hand?

In his original post, Owen appears simply to be introducing definite descriptions (i.e., expressions of the form "(the  $x:Fx$ )" á la Russell as "incomplete symbols" — they are not genuine singular terms in the language, but only occur as parts of convenient definitions for more complex expressions. Hence, they not available for substitution in inference patterns like universal instantiation. So construed, his introduction of definite descriptions does not take him beyond the bounds of FOL=.

.