Re: The Difference between a Set and an Element

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- *From*: Chris Menzel <cmenzel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- *Date*: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 00:55:38 +0000 (UTC)

On 15 Jan 2007 11:15:58 −0800, Paul Holbach
<paulholbachDELETETHENAME@xxxxxxxxxx> said:

> Chris Menzel schrieb:
>
> > Granted, there might be those who would
> > say that {5,17,1383} is the concept of being identical to 5, 17 or 1383
> > (though I think that would be an odd thing to say). So consider
> > instead, for example, an arbitrary infinite set S of natural numbers for
> > which −− unlike, say, {5,17,1383} or the set of prime numbers −− there
> > is no description that characterizes exactly the members of S, and no
> > procedure that lists them. What concept is S? Sure doesn't seem like
> > anything I'd call a concept.
>
> I agree with you insofar as, in the Fregean sense, sets are objects
> and not concepts. As we know, there isn't a set for every concept.
> But isn't it the case that there is a (defining) concept for every
> set, as Gödel conjectured:
>
> "A plausible conjecture is: Every set is the extension of a concept."

It would take a *very* robust and fine−grained notion of "concept" for
that to be so, e.g., one on which there are infinite disjunctive
concepts whose disjuncts are of the form "being identical with A" for
arbitary objects A. I don't see any other way of justifying the claim
that, e.g., every arbitrary subset of N is the extension of a concept.

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