

Re: The Difference between a Set and an Element

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- *From:* Chris Menzel <cmenzel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
 - *Date:* Tue, 16 Jan 2007 13:51:10 +0000 (UTC)
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On 16 Jan 2007 05:13:28 -0800, Paul Holbach said:

Chris Menzel wrote:

Paul Holbach wrote:

Gödel: "A plausible conjecture is: Every set is the extension of a concept."

It would take a *very* robust and fine-grained notion of "concept" for that to be so, e.g., one on which there are infinite disjunctive concepts whose disjuncts are of the form "being identical with A" for arbitrary objects A. I don't see any other way of justifying the claim that, e.g., every arbitrary subset of \mathbb{N} is the extension of a concept.

As far as arbitrary infinite collections are concerned, we would indeed have to posit infinite disjunctive concepts. But that's a matter of theoretical preference, isn't it?

Did I imply anything else?

Gödel's notion of concept is very robust:

"We don't make concepts, they are there."
"Concepts have an objective existence."

[Kurt Gödel—quoted in: Wang, Hao (1996). /A logical journey: From Gödel to philosophy/. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. (pp. 273+316)]

So why not let those infinite disjunctive concepts simply be there?

Re: The Difference between a Set and an Element

Isn't the unrestricted principle <for every set there is a concept whose extension it is> worth it?

I can see a philosophical role for concepts of some sort, but I can't imagine what it buys you to have a disjunctive concept correspondingly uniquely to every set beyond a lot of metaphysical bloat. But then again, I'm not very imaginative.

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