

Re: The Difference between a Set and an Element

Source: <http://sci.tech-archive.net/Archive/sci.logic/2007-01/msg00313.html>

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 - *Date:* Wed, 17 Jan 2007 22:28:28 +0100
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On Wed, 17 Jan 2007 19:15:28 +0000 (UTC), Chris Menzel
<cmenzel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

I can see a philosophical role for concepts of some sort, but I can't imagine what it buys you to have a disjunctive concept correspondingly uniquely to every set beyond a lot of metaphysical bloat. But then again, I'm not very imaginative.

Indeed, the universe of concepts becomes "bloated" thereby. This is already a consequence of Frege's comprehension principle for concepts $[EFAx(Fx \leftrightarrow \phi(x))]$, which G. Frege uses in his proof

I don't usually think of comprehension as having any implications for the existence of concepts at all (though of course they played a role in Frege's own views); the existential quantifier there is ranging over classes.

I don't think so. We are talking about 2OL here. 2OL is not set theory.

See:
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frege-logic/>

But suppose we assume a countable language and that every formula with at least one free variable signifies a concept.

??? Comprehension just guaranties that for every such formula $A[x]$ there is an concept F such that for all x : $Fx \leftrightarrow A[x]$.

Re: The Difference between a Set and an Element

On those assumptions, there are at most countably many concepts

I don't think so. Comprehension just guaranties that there are _at least_ countable many concepts.

F.

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