Re: Why Regularity?

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- *From*: "Rupert" <rupertmccallum@xxxxxxxxx>
- *Date*: 19 Nov 2006 00:55:11 −0800

zuhair wrote:

> Rupert wrote:
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> > zuhair wrote:
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> > > Rupert wrote:
> > >
> > > > The reason why we have the axiom of
> > > > regularity isn't really anything to
> > > > do with the liar paradox. It's just an
> > > > indication of the fact that we
> > > > only want to study well−founded sets. In
> > > > ZF−regularity we can prove
> > > > that the class of well−founded sets is a
> > > > model for ZF with regularity
> > > > anyway.
> > >
> > > I am speaking in a more philosophical manner, I see ZF as a
> > > theory of
> > > finding consistency of statements of the that who always lies.
> > > All sets
> > > in ZFC are lies. Yet , I said such M that all of its statements
> > > are
> > > lies do have consistency, it is the consistency of the total lier,
> > > though I call the later (the opposite truth teller) anyhow.
> > > This is
> > > philosophical. Putting the axioms of regularity confines us to
> > > the lies
> > > that are fairly consistent, it makes us avoid the lier paradox,
> > > which
> > > reveal the philosophical truth to ZF. ZFC with Regularity is
> > > consistent
> > > logically, but philosophically speaking, it is a system of
> > > consistent
> > > lies, see the ulternative that I have proposed, I think this is
> > > the

> HONEST set theory . But It seems not so practical. The Lieying ZF (the
> standard one) is easier to deal with. And since all what we require
> from a set theory is consistency, then it doesn't really matter if ZF
> is philosophically a consistent lie. Since it easier to deal with, then
> let it.
>
> Zuhair

> > There is a mathematical analysis of the liar paradox. Tarski proved
> > that no language can define its own truth predicate. That's how the
> > liar paradox is avoided in mathematics.
>
> Tarski is wrong!

No, he's not. You're obviously not familiar with the work, so why
pretend you're competent to judge it?

> see set theory I have proposed, it has no problem with
> a universe.

That's a different issue. Sure there are consistent set theories with a
universe. So what?

> The set of all things in thereselfs, defines its own truth predicate.

This is gobbledygook. You obviously didn't understand what I meant when
I said "no language can define its own truth predicate". If you want to
understand the work, then read it.

> see the set theory I have proposed, were I need you to formulate the
> infinity axiom in it, that is if you are willing to help me.

As I say, I'll think that problem over, but I suspect it can't be done
in a first−order language.

> > As I say, I don't see what the liar paradox has to do with the axiom of

regularity.

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