

Re: Implementable Set Theory and Consistency of ZFC

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- *From:* "Jesse F. Hughes" <jesse@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
 - *Date:* Wed, 31 Oct 2007 09:31:08 -0400
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Han de Bruijn <Han.deBruijn@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:

Jesse F. Hughes wrote:

Han de Bruijn <Han.deBruijn@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:

So, even if I don't make use of (5-8), a proof of A from (1-4) is a proof from (1-8) ?

Of course.

So, even if I say "there exists a Foo", then such a statement is a valid premise for proving that the integral of $1/t$ from 1 to x is $\ln(x)$? Weird ..

The statement can be proved in the theory consisting of the usual axioms for real analysis and "there exists a Foo", yes. Do you think that every theorem of ZFC uses every axiom of ZFC in its proof?

It seems we have a different picture in our mind about the meaning of an implication $A \Rightarrow B$, as has been pinpointed by Ullrich as well. This is what I say about in in my article:

Another philosophical note is in place, when we are saying that we "make with an axiom" and denote this as an implication $A \Rightarrow B$. In common mathematics, the implication \Rightarrow just means what is defined by a truth table in propositional logic. But there is another form of mathematics, called constructivism.

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Within

constructivist mathematics, an implication has a more "operational" meaning, like: given A, we can construct B from A. So if we say "make with an axiom", then it is expressed herewith that we adhere to the constructivist meaning of an implication. End of philosophical note.

I think that you and Ullrich adhere to the common "material implication" of mathematical logic, where there is no place for axioms that "cause" a theorem (so to speak). In the latter sense there is no room for premises like "there exists a Foo". The axiom of Infinity is of the latter kind.

Sorry, I really can make no sense of this explanation.

As far as I understand constructivism in any case, if a theory T constructively proves statement P, then so does $T + X$ where X is any statement. So it does not seem to me that you have addressed the issue.

Here's what I think you *can* say: Statements (5)–(8) are true in your model and your model is canonical in a sense (I think it's minimal). It is not the case that (5)–(8) are therefore *entailed* by (1)–(4) in any sense of the word that I understand.

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"I've noticed [...] I routinely have been putting up flawed equations with my surrogate factoring work. My take on it is that I have some deep fear that the work is too dangerous and am sabotaging myself."

— James S. Harris

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