Re: Genocide

Source: http://sci.tech−archive.net/Archive/sci.space.history/2007−02/msg00555.html

- *From*: "columbiaaccidentinvestigation" <columbiaaccidentinvestigation@xxxxxxxxx>
- *Date*: 8 Feb 2007 22:20:28 −0800

On Jan 31, 6:28 am, "columbiaaccidentinvestigation"
<columbiaaccidentinvestigat...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> On Jan 31, 2:45 am, OM <om@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 30 Jan 2007 12:35:18 −0600, "Jim" <m...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Sorry OM wrong again. Planet is Kolob. OM should stick to
>>> what he know.
>>
>> ...Actually, I *do* know what I'm talking about here. −Trust− me on
>> this one, there's only two people around here who could probably claim
>> to know more about "Star Trek", and neither of them have been hanging
>> around here as much as they used to − Rick Sternback and Mike Okuda.
>>
>> OM
>> −−
>>]==[
>>] OMBlog −http://www.io.com/~o_m/omworld [
>>] Let's face it: Sometimes you *need* [
>>] an obnoxious opinion in your day! [
>>]==[
>
> well then perhaps om you should try discussinggenocide, how about in
> the Darfur region?
>
> First some information on the government of Sudan's (GOS) actions of
> atrocity in the Darfur region, shows the conflict can be summarized as
> the state department did describing the conflict as "Arabs or (GOS and
> militia forces) vs. non−Arab villagers belonging primarily to the
> Zaghawa, Massilit, and Fur ethnic groups." Now the state department
> citations below shows our administrations current worries for the

conflict in Darfur, and that the current competition for scarce resources has contributed to the conflict such as water and grazing rights (a similarity to U.S. western states issues).

Now maybe a possible solution to stop the hostilities and atrocities amongst the regions peoples would involve addressing the water and grazing rights of the west, just the like oil revenues and infrastructure improvements were part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile−english&y=2....

25 January 2007
Sudan's Peace Accord Making Progress, U.S. Official Says
Director of State Department's Sudan Programs Group Landis comments
By Jim Fisher−Thompson
USINFO Staff Writer
Washington −− The agreement the United States helped broker in Sudan that ended more than 20 years of civil war is making "steady progress," says Lauren Landis, director of the State Department's Sudan Programs Group.
"We see the CPA [Comprehensive Peace Agreement] moving forward," Landis told USINFO during a January 25 interview. "But like any comprehensive settlement, the hard parts are going to take longer."
Nagging issues still remain, she said, like ongoing violence in Darfur, but gains have been made under the agreement in the areas of power sharing, the economy and security. She said such progress forms building blocks for reunifying the divided nation. (See related article.)
Part of that effort involves strengthening South Sudan, Landis explained, and progress is being made there in rebuilding infrastructure, especially roads, as well as training the Southern army. Such training is allowed under the CPA, and those soldiers eventually will be folded into the national army under unification.
The South also is receiving oil revenues under the CPA −− about $1 billion since the agreement was signed −− she added."

http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile−english&y=2....
"20 December 2006
Sudan Must Implement Peace Plan by End of 2006, U.S. Envoy Says
Ambassador Natsios urges Sudan to allow "hybrid" peacekeeping force
By Kathryn McConnell
USINFO Staff Writer
Washington −− If Sudan does not implement fully a negotiated Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for Darfur by the end of 2006, the United States will embark on another strategy to bring relief to the many innocent people in the region who are suffering as a result of ongoing hostilities, says U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan Andrew Natsios.... Natsios said he welcomed Sudan's two−year extension of an accelerated procedure that allows nongovernmental organizations and U.N. aid workers to get into Darfur.

He also said he has offered to be an "intermediary" between Sudan and neighboring Chad. Rising violence in Darfur, which borders Chad, is spilling over into Chad, endangering its citizens and threatening to destabilize a larger area.
For a peace agreement in Darfur to be successful, Natsios said, militant groups will have to be disarmed. Because of violence in the region he did not meet with any rebel leaders as he had planned, he added.
Natsios said he was pleased with the recent appointment of Jan Eliasson, former Swedish foreign minister, as a U.N. special envoy for Darfur to deal with the humanitarian and security crisis. Eliasson, who was president of the 60th U.N. General Assembly, will assume his duties at the beginning of 2007. His main task will be to "work the diplomatic channels" outside Sudan to encourage governments to remain engaged in the issue, said outgoing Secretary−General Kofi Annan."

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/36028.htm
Ethnographic Background
Darfur covers about one−fifth of Sudan's vast territory and is home to one−seventh of its population. It includes a mixture of Arab and non−Arab ethnic groups, both of which are predominantly Muslim (see map, p. 6). The Fur ethnic group (Darfur means "homeland of the Fur") is the largest non−Arab ethnic group in the region. Northern Darfur State is home to the nomadic non−Arab Zaghawa but also includes a significant number of Arabs, such as the Meidab. Sedentary non−Arabs from the Fur, Massalit, Daju, and other ethnic groups live in Western Darfur State. The arid climate and the competition for scarce resources over the years have contributed to recurring conflict between nomadic Arab herders and non−Arab farmers, particularly over land and grazing rights. Various ethnic groups have fought over access to water, grazing rights, and prized agricultural land as desertification has driven herders farther south.
Refugee Interviews−−Survey Results
Most reports followed a similar pattern:
1) GOS aircraft or helicopters bomb villages.
2) GOS soldiers arrive in trucks, followed closely by Jingaweit militia riding horses or camels.
3) GOS soldiers and militia surround and then enter villages, under cover of gunfire.
4) Fleeing villagers are targets in aerial bombing.
5) The Jingaweit and GOS soldiers loot the village after most citizens have fled, often using trucks to remove belongings.
6) Villages often experience multiple attacks over a prolonged period before they are destroyed by burning or bombing.

The Atrocities Documentation Team conducted a random−sample survey of Darfurian refugees in eastern Chad in July and August 2004. The team interviewed 1,136 refugees, many of whom had endured harsh journeys across the desolate Chad−Sudan border.
A plurality of the respondents were ethnic Zaghawa (46 percent), with smaller numbers belonging to the Fur (8 percent) and Massalit (30

percent) ethnic groups. Slightly more than half the respondents (56 percent) were women. (See map, p. 6, showing ethnicity of respondent refugees.)
Respondents reported ethnic tensions in the region had risen over the past few years. For example, markets in which non−Arabs and Arabs had previously interacted have become segregated, and almost all villages are now said to be ethnically homogenous. According to many of the interviewees, GOS soldiers and Jingaweit attacked villages because of their non−Arab populations; men of fighting age have been abducted, executed, or both; and women and girls have been abducted and raped."

Tom

A possible motivation for the Government of Sudan committing genocide against the non−Arab people living in the Darfur region is to lay claim to the land where there are unexplored basins that may yield potentially very large oil and gas reserves. There is a great potential for the Central African Rift System containing basins of large oil fields that extend from western Chad, and the south western region of Sudan, in a northerly direction into Darfur or the western regions of Sudan, up in to southern Egypt. Now using the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) as a model for the a 50/50 revenue sharing deal, along with the current gas and oil concession block sales occurring in Sudan, revenues could be generated for the people of Darfur from the sale of block #12 (see concession map) or subsections of block 12 in the Darfur region. The Darfur Peace Agreement establishes a Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA), sets July 2010 as the time frame for a referendum to determine regional status (see below), and states the governmental representation prior to the referendum, all of which can be used as a marketing tool to attract investors in the region. The Transitional Darfur Regional Authority can assist in negotiating the gas and oil concessions starting Darfurs economic recovery, and groups like the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission D−JAM, and U.S. Aid can assist the region in long term investments for post−conflict reconstruction and development of infrastructure such as water distribution, and drought prevention projects. Petroleum investors have high expectations for possible fields being located in the Darfur region, but it has mainly been the conflicts that have prevented exploration of the regions basins. Maybe the transitional Darfur regional authority could negotiate a preliminary deal lining up the investors for block 12, but with the provision the government of Sudan must immediately stop all military action, and disband the janjaweed militia. The Government of Sudan must not be allowed to continue to ethnically cleansing in the Darfur region of non−Arabs and then attract investors for oil and gas concession sales from the "cleansed" lands of block 12. But instead all the displaced peoples of the Dafur region including non−Arabs must be allowed to return to their homes and villages and reap the benefits of revenues generated from investments in their own region, in addition to possibly receiving financial compensation for atrocities committed by the

government of Sudan. In addition to financial compensation, leveling justice for the acts of genocide committed with the country of Sudan can take place not only by holding national leaders accountable for their actions of siding with one group and ("feeding into this xenophobic, ..ideology, which is racist in nature" ICG see below) but through a process of truth and reconciliation, as historically the peoples of this region have the ability and mechanisms to resolve their own conflict.
tom

Sudan Oil and Gas Consession Map (blocks 1−12)
http://www.apco−sd.com/html/conmap.htm

Sudans Block 4,
http://www.rigzone.com/news/image_detail.asp?img_id=1088

Sudans crude oil production
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Sudan/Oil.html
"Exploration and Production
Exploration and development of Sudan's oil resources has been highly controversial. International human rights organizations have accused the Sudanese government of financing human rights abuses with oil revenues, including the mass displacement of civilians near the oil fields. Factional fighting in the South and rebel attacks on oil infrastructure have kept oil production and exploration from reaching full potential to date. In October 2004, for example, the Sudanese government prevented a militia attempt to sabotage the country's main oil export pipeline. However, the recent peace agreement between the government and the SPLA will likely lead to substantial investment in both production facilities and new exploration initiatives in the country. In January 2005, after the official signing of the CPA, Total, Marathon Oil Corporation, and the Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Company renewed their exploration rights in southern Sudan."

http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=14880
"Ross Clarkson, President & CEO of TransGlobe states, "The Nuqra Concession provides a rare exploration opportunity, a large land position in an under−explored rift basin. Rift basins can be very productive petroleum producers. To the north and south of Nuqra are two rift basins with large oil fields; the Gulf of Suez and the Muglud basin in Sudan. TransGlobe has made several discoveries in the Yemen rift basins and the Nuqra Concession's petroleum system appears to be analogous to the Masila Basin in Yemen. We hope that Nuqra will build upon our success in Yemen, while expanding and diversifying TransGlobe's presence in the Middle East.".. The Nuqra Concession is located in Upper Egypt near of the city of Luxor on the east bank of the Nile River. The concession encompasses over two−thirds of the Kom Ombo Basin, a rift basin analogous to the Gulf of Suez Basin, the Marib Basin in the Republic of Yemen, and the Muglad Basin in Sudan,

all of which contain major reserves. The Nuqra Concession contains more than 30,000 square kilometers or 7,500,000 acres of exploration lands with 13 seismically defined leads identified from over 4,000 km of existing 2D seismic. Seismic and well data have confirmed the existence of Jurassic and Cretaceous sediments and the presence of a petroleum system which could potentially hold significant oil reserves."

Here is the government of sudan, marketing to potential investors in the petroleum industry, from the Sudanese embassy in india.
http://www.embassysudanindia.org/investment/oil−sector.html
"Other international oil companies too have taken concessions in other blocks. There is great potential for investment and the government of Sudan is taking an extremely flexible approach towards companies willing to invest in this sector.
Business opportunities from the development of the oil sector are also considerable, including equipping of the field stations, road links, communications, supply of vehicles and catering. The growth of oil sector has also stimulated the need for power stations, roads, bridges and the development of a river transport system, communication, light industry and petrochemical industry. "

Here is some information on Sudans current and downstream oil production, from the department of energies' energy information agency.
Sudan Country Analysis Brief
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/sudan.pdf
"OIL
Sudan contains proven reserves of 563 million barrels of oil, more than twice the 262 million barrels estimated in 2001. Because much of Sudanese oil exploration has been limited to the central and south−central regions, Sudanese Energy Ministry representatives estimate proven reserves at 700 million barrels and total reserves at five billion barrels, including potential reserves in northwest Sudan , the Blue Nile Basin , and the Red Sea area in eastern Sudan ."

U.S. State Department statement on the Darfur Peace Agreement.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/65972.htm
Fact Sheet
Office of the Spokesman
Washington, DC
May 8, 2006
Darfur Peace Agreement
The Darfur Peace Agreement, signed May 5, 2006, by the largest rebel group, the Sudan Liberation Movement, led by Mini Menawi, and the Sudanese Government, is an important achievement for peace in Darfur. It is a fair agreement that addresses the long−standing marginalization of Darfur, and charts a path for lasting peace for the innocent victims of the crisis.

The agreement requires that the Sudanese Government of National Unity complete verifiable disarmament and demobilization of Janjaweed militia by mid−October 2006 and places restrictions on the movements of the Popular Defense Forces and requires their downsizing. A detailed sequencing and phasing schedule ensures that the African Union certifies that Janjaweed and other armed militia have been disarmed before rebel forces assemble and prepare for their own disarmament and demobilization. The agreement stipulates that 4,000 former combatants be integrated into the Sudanese Armed Forces, 1,000 be integrated into the police forces, and 3,000 be supported through education and training programs. The former combatants will be integrated in groups of 100−150 and will comprise 33 percent of each integrated battalion.

Democratic processes have been laid out for the people of Darfur to choose their leaders and determine their status as a region. Rebel signatories of the agreement were awarded the 4th highest position in the Sudanese Government of National Unity: Senior Assistant to the President and Chairperson of the newly established Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA). The TDRA will be responsible for implementation of the peace agreement in Darfur and the rebel movements will have effective control of that body. In July 2010, a popular referendum will be held to decide whether to establish Darfur as a unitary region with a single government. For the three−year period prior to elections, the agreement grants the rebel movements twelve seats in the National Assembly in Khartoum, 21 seats in each of the Darfur State legislatures, one State Governor and two Deputy State Governors in Darfur, senior positions in State Ministries, and key posts in local governments.

The accord commits the international community to holding a donors' conference to pledge additional funds for Darfur, and invites the TDRA Chairperson to present to that conference a summary of needs and priorities. The GNU is mandated to contribute $300 million initially and then $200 million/year for the next two years to rebuild the region. A Joint Assessment Mission − modeled on the one done for Southern reconstruction after the Comprehensive (North−South) Peace Agreement − will be established to determine the specific reconstruction and development needs of Darfur.

Buffer zones are to be established around camps for internally displaced persons and humanitarian assistance corridors, and a commission has been created to work with the United Nations to help refugees and displaced persons return to their homes. The agreement provides that the Sudanese Government will provide $30 million in compensation to victims of the conflict.

2006/472 "

The Darfur Joint Assesment Mission

http://www.unsudanig.org/darfurjam/index.php?fid=intro

"As mandated in the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) the parties, GNU and SLM, have now embarked upon a process to identify key early recovery and long term reconstruction and development needs for Darfur. This

process, the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission (D−JAM), is led by the parties with support from the international community, particularly the United Nations and the World Bank, and the African Development Bank (AfDB). "

U.S. AID
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub−saharan_africa/sudan/
"Darfur: On May 5, 2006, the Government of National Unity and the largest faction of the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement signed a historic peace agreement to bring an end to conflict in the Darfur region. The conflict had been raging since 2003, when the SLA/M and Justice and Equality Movement rebelled against the government, which responded by supporting local militias known as the janjaweed to put down the rebels. The resulting violence affects more than 3.8 million people, more than 2 million of whom have been driven from their homes. The Darfur Peace Agreement addresses the long−standing marginalization of Darfur and charts a path for lasting peace by detailing timelines for disarmament, demobilization, integration, power sharing, and wealth sharing. USAID has been a leader in the massive international assistance program to Darfur, providing extensive humanitarian and food aid, working to ensure humanitarian access in unstable areas, and preparing for eventual reconstruction."

The Darfur Peace Agreement.
http://www.unmis.org/english/2006Docs/DPA_ABUJA−5−05−06−withSignatures.pdf
ARTICLE 18
FISCAL FEDERALISM AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
Assignment of Revenue Bases
118. The states of Darfur shall be entitled to raise and administer:
(a) Land and property taxes and royalties;
(b) Service charges for state services;
(c) License fees;
(d) Darfur states' personal income tax;
(e) Levies on tourism;
(f) Darfur states' share in revenues from oil and other natural resources produced in Darfur states;
(g) Darfur state government projects and nature parks;
(h) Stamp duties;
(i) Agricultural taxes;
(j) Excise taxes;
(k) Loans and borrowing both domestic and foreign in accordance with their creditworthiness and consistent with the national macroeconomic policy framework;
(l) Grants in aid and foreign aid grants.
(m)Allocation from the NRF mentioned in paragraph 115 above.
(n) All allocations for Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund to be established consistent with the general principles agreed upon by the Parties.

(o) All other taxes or fees legislated from time to time, within their jurisdictions.
119. Darfur states may, within their competencies and jurisdictions, enter into
agreements to enhance revenue mobilization and administration."

Darfur Lives Under Siege, is a study of the history and culture of the people who live in the Darfur Region of Sudan, and demonstrates each of the ethnic groups has the mechanisms to deal with the necessary reconciliation after genocide.
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADC475.pdf

This link to "Examples of Reconciliaton", a conference where African leaders discussed the issues associated with reconciling the conflict between people after the violence of genocide.
http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/0504/africa.html
Examples of Reconciliation
Africa's Contributions to the Global Community
African leaders and scholars gathered at the Library of Congress recently to discuss reconciliation−how people, in post−conflict environments, can promote healing and mutually beneficial and trusting relationships that will ultimately lead to sustainable peace in countries torn apart by war, genocide and other violence in Africa in the last two decades of the 20th century....
Joseph Nzabmwita, defense attaché at the Embassy of the Republic of Rwanda, discussed the gachacha model of reconciliation, a traditional African village system that works on the principle of reconciling the parties and promoting social harmony rather than penalizing the guilty party. "Under the Western criminal justice system, it's going to take 100 years to try these cases," Nzabmwita said. "So who is that justice going to benefit?"
After July 1994, at the end of the genocide in Rwanda, there were nearly 1 million dead. "Our government was destroyed and our society dismantled," Nzabmwita said. "We needed to move ahead. We needed to rebuild our society. So we sat down and went back to our roots−simply sitting together and discussing among ourselves the truth." The truth included learning from the perpetrators where to find the dead bodies so families could give them proper burials. After learning the truth, healing could begin. "Through gachacha, we will benefit," Nzabmwita said.
Derek Moyo, deputy chief of mission at the Embassy of the Republic of South Africa, said reconciliation could not be imposed or legislated. Also, reconciliation is not a one−day event. "It is a process that will go beyond the truth commissions. The truth commission is just one method," Moyo said. He also said models of truth commissions cannot be transplanted elsewhere into other situations....
Ketumile Masire, president of Botswana from 1980 to 1998, discussed the reconciliation efforts in South Africa, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. "I want to emphasize that every conflict situation is different and thus requires a particular reconciliation approach.

Also conflicts have complicated roots; rarely is there a simple determinant, such as ethnicity, religion or economics. But many are at play.
"Whatever the circumstances, one cannot build reconciliation on a system of injustice. Justice is the bedrock in any nation that seeks to be free of resentment and wounds of history," Masire said.
Pierre Buyoya, president of Burundi from 1987 to 1993 and from 1996 to 2003, now a visiting senior fellow with the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, described the importance and effectiveness of the Wise Men Council in Burundi, a traditional grassroots institution. Each village has its own council and councilmen are selected in front of the whole village. The council resolves 80 percent of the conflicts. "Nobody needs to pay large legal fees. Without the council, the legal system would have to be 10 times larger," said Buyoya."

Update on Darfur from the International Crisis Group
http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/41406.htm
Update on Crisis Hot Spots Around the World
Nancy Soderberg, Vice President for Multilateral Affairs at the International Crisis Group ; Suliman Baldo, Africa Program Director at the International Crisis Group
Foreign Press Center Briefing
New York, New York
January 27, 2005
10:00 A.M. EST
MS. NISBET: Thanks, everyone, for coming this morning. I would like to introduce Ambassador Nancy Soderberg, ICG's Vice President for Multilateral Affairs, as well as Suliman Baldo, the head of the Africa Program here in New York.
As you probably know, the International Crisis Group helps to prevent and resolve conflicts around the world. They are here today to talk about crisis hotspots around the world, as well as highlighting recent developments in Africa.
I'd like to thank Mr. Baldo and Ambassador Soderberg for being here today. We can start out with opening remarks and then go into questions. Please state your name and affiliation before asking your questions. Thank you....

QUESTION: We often hear about conflicts in Darfur between Arab Sudanese and Black
African Sudanese. How accurate are they?

MR. BALDO: This is not accurate. If you go to Darfur, you wouldn't distinguish who is Arab and who is not. These are political identities. The region is, you know, one of coexistence between these groups. They have been there for generations. They have been interchanging, you know, peacefully coexisting, intermarrying. They are all Muslim. You know, the level of Arabization and Islamization that is taking place in Darfur spontaneously before has been very

great and therefore, differences that existed in the past, for example, over grazing lands, over access to water sources, were settled through communion, peace, settlement, you know, conflict resolution mechanisms −− communion and conflict resolution mechanisms.

The governments of Sudan, during the colonial period and after the colonial period and their independence, acted as literal arbitrators and guarantors of agreements that were reached by the communities themselves.

It's only in the mid−1980s that some Darfur groups of Arab background thought to exploit their ethnic, you know, background for political gain and they formed, you know, a certain pressure group under that label, you know, the Arabs of Darfur. It's a recent identity, which is of a political nature. The Government of Sudan today has decided to side with one group against the other, therefore feeding into this xenophobic, into this ideology, which is racist in nature, finally.

The other groups that are at the receiving end of these policies of exclusion are now identifying with the African identity because they need a common identity as groups that are targeted, that are victimized by this, you know, aggression from the groups of Arab origin and by, you know, backed by the Government of Sudan. They believe that there is an advantage in this label because of the international sympathy from the humanitarian community, from NGOs and the public opinion internationally as demonstrated over the last few years.

They believe also that there are some advantages by identifying themselves with the Sudan People's Liberation Army, the SPLA of southern Sudan. Initially, the SPLA has helped these Darfurian groups of African origin through some logistical support, some training, some, you know, some contribution to their political manifesto and the like.

But then as the SPLA, as the southern SPLA became engaged in the peace process with Khartoum, they disengaged because they were talking seriously about, you know, about peace with the government, and they didn't want to be exploited at a different level.

The fact of the matter −− the situation of this polarity, Arab versus non−Arab, has been fed by Khartoum, and it is leading to the reversal of all the spontaneous form of Arabization, Islamization that has been taking place in Darfur for centuries. And it's done in the name of Islam, which is totally, you know, irresponsible, to say the least.

But you know, from the side of Khartoum government.

QUESTION: I mean, if you have, you know, −−

MR. BALDO: Yeah −−

QUESTION: (Inaudible) actions that the Security Council may take, whether we're talking about the sanctions or the referral to the Criminal Court, do you or the Ambassador think that those measures will be adequate enough to arrest the deterioration in Darfur?

AMBASSADOR SODERBERG: It certainly helps. I mean, if you look at what the international community has actually done so far, it's not much. You know, it's threatened sanctions that they don't impose, and then they talk about a force that doesn't exist. And there, the Sudanese Government has pretty much had a free hand to conduct genocide or ethnic cleansing, depending on how you define it. A lot of people are still dying there.

And so if they really were to do a referral and have a serious investigation, whether it's the ICC or some other cobbled−together investigatory body, I think it would send a chilling effect through those responsible for this campaign.

And, you know, targeted sanctions do tend to have an impact on individuals' decision making. I mean, we've seen it in other cases. And so I think it's time for, you know, real decisions on this issue.

MR. BALDO: Yes, I would agree, definitely. The referral to the ICC would really be, in the sense of holding particular individuals in the government structure responsible for the policies of, you know, that have led to massive war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and actions against the populations of Darfur −− whatever the label you use on them, there is no hierarchy in international law. You know, these are all crimes under international law, and the mere naming of officials who are responsible for this policy would have that chilling effect, that Khartoum cannot go on a ride because of all these divisions within the international community about the International Criminal Court or about this and that.

The mere naming of these officials would send a very strong message. You know, they cannot devise policies that attack civilians with impunity. You know, there is a determination to end that."

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